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The Growth of Nations 
AVERAGE  INCOMES  in the world's  richest countries  are more than ten 
times as high as in the world's poorest countries. It is apparent to anyone 
who travels the world that these large differences in income lead to large 
differences in the quality of life. Less apparent are the reasons for these 
differences.  What is it about the United States, Japan, and Germany that 
makes these countries so much richer than India, Indonesia,  and Nige- 
ria? How can the rich countries be sure to maintain their high standard 
of living? What can the poor countries do to join the club? 
After many years of neglect,  these questions are again at the center of 
macroeconomic  research and teaching. Long-run growth is now widely 
viewed  to be at least as important as short-run fluctuations.  Moreover, 
growth is not just important. It is also a topic about which macroecono- 
mists, with their crude aggregate models,  have something useful to say. 
My goal here is to assess  what we now know about economic  growth. 
The scope  of this paper is selective  and, to some extent,  idiosyncratic. 
The study of growth has itself grown so rapidly in recent years that it 
would take an entire book to discuss the field thoroughly.  1 In this paper, 
I do not try to lay out the many different views  in the large literature on 
economic  growth. Instead,  I try to present my own views,  as cogently 
as I can, on what we know about the growth of nations. 
Textbook  Neoclassical  Theory 
Most students of economics  begin their study of long-run growth with 
the neoclassical  model of capital accumulation.  When discussing  what 
we know about growth, this model is the natural place to start. 
I am grateful to  Laurence  Ball,  John Leahy,  Edmund Phelps,  Jordan Rappaport, 
Michael Rashes, Paul Romer, Jaume Ventura, David Weil, and Martin Weitzman for help- 
ful comments, and to the National Science  Foundation for financial support. 
1.  Indeed, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) have just finished such a book. 
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Overview 
Robert Solow provided the most basic version of the neoclassical  the- 
ory of growth.2 The centerpiece  of the model is the production function 
(1)  Y = F (K, AL), 
where Y  is output, K is capital, L is labor, and A is a measure of the level 
of technology.  AL can be seen as the labor force measured in efficiency 
units,  which incorporates both the amount of labor and the productivity 
of labor as determined by the available technology.  If we assume  that 
the production function has constant returns to scale,  we can write the 
production function as 
(2)  y = f(k), 
where  y  =  YIAL, k =  K/AL,  andf(k)  =  F(k, 1). This  production  function 
relates output per efficiency  unit of labor to the amount of capital per 
efficiency unit of labor. 
The neoclassical  model emphasizes  how growth arises from the accu- 
mulation of capital. The capital stock per efficiency  unit, k, evolves  ac- 
cording to 
(3)  k=sf(k)  -  (n +  g  +  )k, 
where s is the rate of saving, n is the rate of population growth, g is the 
rate of growth in technology,  6 is the rate at which capital depreciates, 
and a dot over a variable denotes  change per unit of time. The model 
takes s, n, g, and 6 as exogenous. 
As long as the production function is well behaved,  the economy  ap- 
proaches a steady state over time. The steady state is defined by 
(4)  k =  0, 
or, using a star to denote a steady-state  value, 
(5)  sf(k*)  =  (n  +  g  +  5)k*. 
In the steady state, income per efficiency  unit, y*  = f(k*),  is constant. 
Income  per person  grows  at rate g,  and  total  income  grows  at  rate 
(n  +  g). 
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Predictions 
One strength of Solow's  version of the neoclassical  growth model is 
that, despite its simplicity,  it has many predictions.  Since these predic- 
tions are so well-known,  I will not formally derive them here.  But,  in 
evaluating the usefulness  of the model in explaining growth experiences, 
it is worth stating some of these predictions once again: 
1.  In the long run, the economy  approaches a steady state that is inde- 
pendent of initial conditions. 
2.  The steady-state level of income depends on the rates of saving and 
population growth. The higher the rate of saving, the higher the steady- 
state  level  of  income  per person.  The  higher the  rate of  population 
growth, the lower the steady-state  level of income per person. 
3.  The steady-state rate of growth of income per person depends only 
on the rate of technological  progress; it does not depend on the rates of 
saving and population growth. 
4.  In the steady state, the capital stock grows at the same rate as in- 
come,  so the capital-to-income  ratio is constant. 
5.  In the  steady  state,  the marginal product  of capital is constant, 
whereas the marginal product of labor grows at the rate of technological 
progress. 
These  predictions  are broadly consistent  with experience.  If factors 
of production earn their marginal product, then the last prediction can 
be tested with data on factor prices. As a first approximation, in the U. S. 
economy  the real wage grows at about the same rate as income per per- 
son,  and the profit rate exhibits  little trend. These  facts are consistent 
with prediction  5.  Similarly,  the capital-to-income  ratio exhibits  little 
trend, which is consistent  with prediction 4. 
The  dependence  of  steady-state  income  on  saving  and population 
growth rates (prediction 2) also  appears to be consistent  with experi- 
ence.  In cross-country  data income  per person is positively  correlated 
with  saving  rates  and  negatively  correlated  with  population  growth 
rates. Moreover,  these correlations are quite strong: a regression of in- 
come per person on these two variables alone, using a sample of ninety- 
eight countries,  yields an adjusted R2 of 59 percent.3 It is possible  that 
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reverse  causality  is part of the story here; but at the very least,  these 
correlations do not give any reason to doubt the model. 
The other two predictions  are less  easily  evaluated.  The inability of 
saving to affect steady-state  growth (prediction 3) might appear incon- 
sistent  with the strong correlation  between  growth and saving across 
countries.  But this correlation  could  reflect the transitional dynamics 
that arise as economies  approach their steady states. The independence 
of the steady state from initial conditions (prediction 1) is closely  related 
to the debate over convergence,  which I discuss below. 
The simplicity of the neoclassical  model,  together with its ability to 
yield substantive  and seemingly  reasonable  predictions,  has given it a 
prominent place in the macroeconomist's  toolbox.  Whenever practical 
macroeconomists  have to answer questions about long-run growth, they 
usually begin with a simple neoclassical  growth model.  For example, 
when the 1994 Economic Report of the President  discusses  the benefits 
of higher national saving,  it does  so by offering numerical simulations 
from a standard growth model of the sort Solow presented almost forty 
years earlier.4 
Household  Behavior 
So far I have followed  Solow's  rendition of the neoclassical  model in 
treating the saving rate as an exogenous  parameter. This approach is ex- 
traordinarily useful. It allows us to abstract from household behavior in 
order to highlight the roles of capital accumulation,  population growth, 
and technological  progress.  In other words, by sweeping the saving de- 
cision under the rug, we can concentrate our attention on the production 
side of the model. 
If we want to add an explicit analysis of household  behavior, we can 
choose  from two basic approaches.  We can follow Paul Samuelson and 
Peter Diamond and model the economy  as composed  of a series of over- 
lapping g-nerations,  each with a finite lifetime.5 Or we can follow Frank 
Ramsey,  David Cass,  and Tjalling Koopmans  and model the economy 
with a single,  infinitely lived  representative  consumer.6 Both of these 
4.  Economic Report of the President,  1994, pp. 85-87. 
5.  See Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). 
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approaches  parsimoniously  turn the Solow  model into a rigorous gen- 
eral-equilibrium model. 
These two models of household behavior differ in some important re- 
spects.  For example,  in the overlapping-generations  model,  the econ- 
omy can accumulate  too much capital. In particular, the economy  can 
reach a steady  state with the capital stock  greater than what Edmund 
Phelps called the Golden Rule level.7 This outcome is not possible in the 
representative-consumer  model, for the representative consumer would 
never choose  an allocation of resources that is dynamically inefficient.8 
To give another example, in the overlapping-generations model, govern- 
ment debt can alter the saving rate and the capital stock. In the represen- 
tative-consumer  model,  Ricardian equivalence  holds,  and so  govern- 
ment debt does not crowd out capital. 
For most of the issues addressed by neoclassical  growth theory, how- 
ever, the two approaches to household behavior yield similar results. In 
both the overlapping-generations  and representative-consumer  models, 
the economy  reaches  a steady  state with a constant  saving  rate. The 
steady-state  saving rate is higher when  consumer  preferences  exhibit 
more patience.  In both models, a constant saving rate can arise even out 
of steady state for specific functional forms and parameter values.  The 
steady states in these models are much the same as the steady states in 
the Solow  model.  In particular, the five predictions  listed  above  con- 
tinue to hold. 
In my view,  neither of these standard approaches to modeling house- 
hold behavior is fully satisfactory,  for neither holds up under empirical 
scrutiny. The overlapping-generations  model assumes  that all saving is 
for life-cycle  purposes; yet bequests are a large part of wealth accumula- 
tion.9 The representative-consumer  model assumes  that all consumers 
look into the infinite future when deciding how much to save; yet many 
people leave no bequests and, therefore, are not economically  linked to 
future generations.  Both models of household behavior are based on the 
premise that people smooth consumption  over their own lifetimes; yet, 
in the world, consumption  smoothing is far from perfect. '0 
7.  Phelps (1961). 
8.  Although important as a matter of theory,  excessive  capital accumulation  is not a 
practical concern for policymakers.  Actual economies  appear to have less capital than the 
Golden Rule level.  See Abel and others (1989). 
9.  Kotlikoff and Summers (1981). 
10.  Campell and Mankiw (1989). 280  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
For the purposes of this paper, these issues  regarding household  be- 
havior are tangential. Little would be added (and much generality would 
be lost) by tying the analysis to either the overlapping-generations model 
or the representative-consumer  model. Therefore, like Solow,  I will ab- 
stract from household behavior and take the saving rate as given. 
I do not mean this choice  to suggest that explaining saving is uninter- 
esting or unimportant. Indeed,  as I hope to make clear, the saving rate 
is a crucial variable to understand. Yet the models  of saving routinely 
employed  in the growth literature do not take us very far toward this 
goal. Until better models of household behavior are developed,  the most 
we can do is discuss  some general lessons  about economic  growth that 
apply regardless of what determines national saving. 
Theoretical  Objections 
Is  the  neoclassical  model  a good  theory  of  economic  growth?  Al- 
though this question is largely empirical, one might also answer it along 
theoretical  lines.  Before  turning to the data, therefore,  let us consider 
some  possible  theoretical  objections  one  might lodge against the neo- 
classical growth model. 
One might object to the model on the grounds that it does not, in the 
end, shed light on economic  growth. In the steady state of the neoclassi- 
cal model, all growth is due to advances in technology,  but technological 
progress is taken as exogenous.  It might seem that the model unravels 
the mystery of economic  growth simply by assuming that there is eco- 
nomic growth. Indeed, this critique helped to motivate the recent theo- 
ries of endogenous  growth, which I discuss later. 
The  persuasiveness  of this objection  to the neoclassical  model  de- 
pends on the purpose of growth theory. If the goal is to explain why stan- 
dards of living are higher today than a century ago, then the neoclassical 
model is not very illuminating. In my view,  however,  the goal is not to 
explain the existence  of economic  growth. That task is too easy: it is ob- 
vious that living standards rise over time largely because knowledge ex- 
pands and production functions improve. 
A more challenging goal is to explain the variation in economic growth 
that we  observe  in different countries  and in different times.  For this 
purpose,  the neoclassical  model's  assumption  of constant,  exogenous 
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the model predicts that different countries  will reach different steady- 
state levels of income per person, depending on their rates of saving and 
population  growth.  And  it predicts  that countries  will  have  different 
rates of growth, depending on each country's  initial deviation from its 
own steady state. Thus, the assumption of constant, exogenous  techno- 
logical change does not preclude addressing many of the central issues 
of growth theory. 
To  use  the neoclassical  model  to  explain  international variation in 
growth requires the assumption that different countries use roughly the 
same production function at a given point in time. To some writers, this 
assumption  is preposterous."  In poor countries,  workers  dig ditches 
with  shovels.  In rich countries,  they  use  bulldozers.  Common  sense 
seems to suggest that we abandon the premise of a common production 
function. 
In my view, this objection to the neoclassical  model is also not persua- 
sive. The production function should not be viewed literally as a descrip- 
tion of a specific production process,  but as a mapping from quantities 
of inputs into a quantity of output. To say that different countries have 
the same production function is merely to say that if they had the same 
inputs,  they would produce the same output.  Different countries  with 
different levels of inputs need not rely on exactly the same processes  for 
producing goods  and services.  When an economy  doubles  its capital 
stock,  it does  not give each worker twice  as many shovels.  Instead,  it 
replaces  shovels  with bulldozers.  For the purposes  of modeling  eco- 
nomic growth, this change should be viewed  as a movement  along the 
same production function, rather than as a shift to a completely new pro- 
duction function. 
In summary, various theoretical objections  can be advanced against 
the neoclassical  growth model. Yet none is compelling.  More important 
is the empirical question: Can the model help to explain the wide varia- 
tion in economic  experiences  observed throughout the world? 
Three  Problems  for Neoclassical  Growth  Theory 
The neoclassical  model has come under attack in recent years as pro- 
viding an empirically inadequate theory of growth. I now turn to some 
11.  See, for example,  Grossman and Helpman (1994). 282  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
of the problems that arise when this model is brought to the data. In par- 
ticular, I consider three reasons to doubt the validity of the neoclassical 
model, at least as it has been traditionally interpreted. 
The approach I take here is one of calibration rather than estimation. 
The problems that I highlight do not hinge on subtle issues  of theory or 
econometrics.  They are, I hope to show, robust implications of the neo- 
classical model that are evaluated fairly easily.  The issue at hand is not 
whether the neoclassical  model is exactly true. The issue is whether the 
model can even come close to making sense of international experience. 
Problem  1: The Magnitude  of International  Differences 
Suppose,  for the  moment,  that all economies  were  in their steady 
states.  The neoclassical  model predicts that different countries  should 
have different levels of income per person, depending on the various pa- 
rameters that determine the steady state. To see these predictions,  con- 
sider the two steady-state  conditions: 
(6)  sy*  =  (n + g  +  5)k*, 
and 
(7)  y*  =f(k*). 
Equation  6  says  the  saving  must  equal  break-even  investment  (the 
amount of investment  required to keep k constant).  Equation 7 is the 
production function. 
To see the predicted variation in income per person, differentiate this 
system and solve for dy* to obtain 
(8)  dy*ly* =  [o/(1  -  o)][dsls  -  d(n +  g  +  5)I(n +  g  +  6)], 
where cx  = f' (k*)k*lf(k*). If the factors of production earn their marginal 
product, then cx  is the steady-state  capital share. Notice  that this equa- 
tion does not require that the production function be Cobb-Douglas.  If 
it is Cobb-Douglas,  then cx  is a constant production function parameter. 
Equation  8 is easily  calibrated with data from the national income 
accounts.  A  standard  estimate  of  the  capital  share  is  one-third,  so 
c(l1  -  ox)  is one-half. The equation now shows the magnitude of income 
differences that the neoclassical  model can explain. In particular, it says 
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are proportionately  half as large.  If one  country's  saving  rate is four 
times that of another country, its steady-state income will be about twice 
as large. 
The equation also has numerical implications for the impact of popula- 
tion growth. For example,  suppose that (g + 6) is 5 percent per year. (As 
I discuss later, this figure is about right.) Then, a decrease in population 
growth from 3 to 1 percent per year reduces (n  +  g  +  6) from 8 to 6 per- 
cent.  If o/(l  -  cx) is one-half,  then steady-state  income moves  propor- 
tionately half as much as (n  +  g  +  8). Hence,  a country with 1 percent 
population growth will have steady-state  income  1.15 [(816)112] times the 
steady-state  income of a country with 3 percent population growth. 
These  calculations  show the first defect of the neoclassical  model: it 
does  not predict the large differences  in income  observed  in the real 
world. A comparison of rich and poor countries finds saving rates that 
differ by about a multiple of four and population growth rates that vary 
by about 2 percentage points. 12 The above calculations,  therefore, indi- 
cate  that the  model  can  explain  incomes  that vary  by  a multiple  of 
slightly more than two.  Yet income  per person varies by a multiple of 
more than ten. There is much more disparity in international living stan- 
dards than the neoclassical  model predicts. 
These findings might once again call into question the assumption that 
all countries  operate with the same production function.  Perhaps poor 
countries have not only low saving and high population growth, but also 
poor production technologies.  But it should be clear that the magnitude 
of the unexplained  differences  makes this explanation  unsatisfactory. 
My calculations above indicate that the neoclassical  model leaves a mul- 
tiple of five in income per person unexplained.  If differences in the pro- 
duction function  are the reason,  then poor countries  must be using a 
technology  that is vastly inferior to that of rich countries.  That is, poor 
countries could be producing much more output without increasing the 
quantities of their capital or their labor. If this were the case,  the incen- 
tive to imitate technology used by rich countries would be tremendous. 13 
Of course,  imitating technology  is not necessarily  so easy.  To adopt 
12.  See Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992, data appendix). 
13.  It may be helpful to state this point in units of time.  If technological  change en- 
hances productivity by 2 percent per year, and if rich countries are five times as productive 
as poor countries,  then poor countries  must be using a production function that is about 
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the best  available  technology,  an economy  may  need  a skilled  labor 
force. In this case, however,  it would not be enough simply to assert that 
there are international differences  in production functions  without fur- 
ther analysis.  Instead, one is naturally led to think about the role of hu- 
man capital in economic  growth. I take up this issue later. 
Problem 2: The Rate  of Convergence 
Much of the recent debate over economic  growth has centered on the 
issue  of convergence.  Convergence  has usually been defined as a ten- 
dency  of poor economies  to grow more rapidly than rich economies. 
Convergence  in  this  sense  might  more  properly  be  called  mean  re- 
version. 
Whether convergence  is found in the data depends on the sample be- 
ing examined.  Samples that include relatively homogeneous  economies, 
such as the countries  of the OECD or the states of the United  States, 
typically  yield  evidence  of  convergence.'4  Yet  more diverse  samples 
give the opposite  result. In large samples of countries,  such as the data 
set compiled  by Robert Summers and Alan Heston,  a country's  initial 
level of income per person is not correlated with its subsequent growth 
rate. 15 
As  I have described  the neoclassical  model,  it does  not necessarily 
predict convergence.  If countries are in different steady states, then rich 
countries  remain rich, and poor countries  remain poor.  On the other 
hand, if all countries have the same steady state and differ only in initial 
conditions,  then the model does predict convergence.  Those who reject 
the  neoclassical  model  on  the  grounds  that it predicts  convergence, 
which does not occur in large samples of countries,  appear to be assum- 
ing this very special case of identical steady states. 
More generally,  the neoclassical  model predicts that each economy 
converges to its own steady state, which in turn is determined by its sav- 
ing and population growth rates. This prediction has been called condi- 
tional convergence.  To  test  for conditional  convergence,  various  au- 
thors have run regressions  of growth rates on initial income,  including 
variables to control for determinants of the steady state. 16 Most studies 
14.  See, for example, Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991). 
15.  Summers and Heston (1991); Romer (1987). 
16.  See, for example,  Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), and Levine and 
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have found evidence  of conditional convergence  at a rate of about 2 per- 
cent per year. That is, each country moves  2 percent closer to its own 
steady  state each year and, by implication,  moves  halfway toward its 
steady state in thirty-five years. This rate of conditional convergence  is 
fairly robust to the sample being examined. 
Although conditional convergence  is qualitatively consistent  with the 
neoclassical  model, the model begins to have problems once again when 
we turn to its quantitative predictions.  According to the model,  income 
converges  to its steady-state  level as follows: 
(9)  y  -(y-  y*), 
where 
(10)  o=(1-cx)(n  + g  +). 
These equations are derived in the appendix. For the purposes at hand, 
the key parameter is the rate of convergence,  A. This parameter mea- 
sures how quickly a deviation from steady state dissipates over time. If 
n,  g,  and 6 are measured as percent per year, then A indicates the per- 
centage of the deviation from steady state that is eliminated each year. 17 
This formula is easily  calibrated.  In the United  States,  for example, 
the  capital  share,  cx, is  about  one-third,  and  the  rate  of  population 
growth, n, is about 1 percent per year. The average rate of growth of in- 
come per person is about 2 percent per year, which gives us a value for g. 
If we take the capital consumption allowance and divide it by the capital 
stock, we obtain an estimate of the depreciation rate, 6, of 3 percent per 
year. Together with the equation above, these estimates give a predicted 
rate of convergence,  A, of 4 percent per year. At this rate, an economy 
would  go  halfway  toward  its  steady  state  in seventeen  and one-half 
years. 
Hence,  although the model does predict the conditional convergence 
found in the empirical literature on economic  growth, it does not predict 
the rate of convergence  that these  studies  estimate.  In particular, the 
model predicts convergence  at about twice the rate that actually occurs. 
In practice,  economies  do regress toward their conditional  mean,  but 
17. The rate of convergence  depends on the steady-state  capital share, ox,  but not on 
the specific form of the production  function.  If the production function  happens  to be 
Cobb-Douglas, then ot  is a production function parameter. If it is not Cobb-Douglas,  then 
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only  slowly.  An economy's  initial condition  matters for much longer 
than the model says it should. 
Problem 3: Rates  of Return 
A third critique of the neoclassical  model emphasizes  the predicted 
differences  in rates of return. If poor countries  are poor because  they 
have small capital stocks,  then the marginal product of capital should be 
high. We should,  therefore,  observe  higher profit rates and higher real 
interest  rates in poor countries.  Moreover,  capital should be eager to 
flow from rich to poor countries. 
There is some evidence  for return differentials of this sort. Because 
the  profit rate is  capital income  divided  by  the  capital  stock,  it also 
equals the capital share of income divided by the capital-income ratio. If 
one accumulates  data on investment  to obtain data on capital stocks, 
one finds that capital-income  ratios are more than twice as large in rich 
as in poor countries.18  Unless  rich countries have capital shares that are 
also more than twice  as large (which appears not to be the case),  they 
must have lower profit rates.  This seems  qualitatively  consistent  with 
the neoclassical  model. 
Persistent return differentials are not necessarily puzzling, even in the 
presence  of capital mobility, if the differentials are modest.  Investment 
abroad,  particularly  in  poor  countries,  involves  greater  information 
costs  and greater risk of expropriation.  Many American investors  are 
only beginning to see the virtues of international diversification,  even in 
other developed  economies.  Investment  in the so-called emerging mar- 
kets is still rare. Those  investors  who are now entering these  markets, 
often through mutual funds, do expect to earn higher returns. 
The neoclassical  model runs into trouble when we turn from qualita- 
tive to quantitative predictions about rates of return. To see the magni- 
tude of the predicted return differentials,  consider  the following  equa- 
tions (which hold both in and out of steady state): 
(2)  y  =  f(k) 
(11)  R =f '(k). 
The first equation is the production function. The second equation says 
that the gross  return to capital, R,  is the marginal product of capital, 
18.  See, for example,  Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992, p. 431). N. Gregory Mankiw  287 
which equals the first derivative of the production function. Differentiat- 
ing these equations, with some manipulation, yields 
(12)  dRIR =  [ff'ICf,)2]dyly. 
Additional algebra allows substitution forf, f',  andf'  in order to obtain 
a more easily interpreted expression: 
(13)  dRIR =  -[(1  - ot)(ota)]dyly, 
where ox  is the capital share and u is the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labor. 19  This equation shows how the return to capital varies 
with the level of income. 
As equation  13 illustrates,  it is impossible  to establish a quantitative 
prediction about return differentials without saying something about the 
elasticity  of  substitution  between  capital  and  labor.  A  common  ap- 
proach is to assume  that the production function  is Cobb-Douglas,  so 
that (J  =  1.20  Imposing also the standard value for cx  of one-third gives 
(14)  (1 -  ox)/(xot)  =  2. 
That is, the return to capital moves  proportionately  twice  as much (in 
the opposite  direction) as the level  of income.  Because  poor countries 
have about one-tenth the income of rich countries,  they should have re- 
turns to capital that are about one hundred times as large. In particular, 
since  the profit rate is about  10 percent  per year in rich countries,  it 
should be about 1,000 percent per year in poor countries.  Detailed data 
are not necessary  to reject this prediction. Moreover,  the return differ- 
ential is so large that the failure of capital to move toward poor countries 
cannot be explained by invoking information costs or political risk. 
This  prediction,  however,  relies  crucially  on  the  assumption  of  a 
Cobb-Douglas production function. The size of the predicted return dif- 
ferentials can be reduced by assuming a larger elasticity  of substitution 
between  capital and labor. If the elasticity  is four, for example,  the re- 
turn to capital in a poor country should be only 3.2 [101/2] times as large 
as in a rich country, in contrast to the previous multiple of 100. Although 
this figure is still large, it is empirically much more plausible.21 
19.  Straightforward algebra establishes  that ot = f'k/f and cr =  I -  fl(f'k)]. 
20.  See, for example,  Lucas (1990). 
21.  The calculations  in this paragraph are indicative of how the elasticity  of substitu- 
tion matters, but they should not be taken too literally. These  calculations  rely on a log- 
linear approximation that is exact if a equals one, but becomes  less accurate as cr departs 
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A large elasticity  of substitution is not as outlandish as it might first 
appear. Cobb-Douglas is often considered  a reasonable assumption be- 
cause factor shares in U.S.  data are roughly constant over time. Yet, in 
the neoclassical  model, factor shares are constant in the steady state for 
any production function. Factor shares may be roughly constant in U.S. 
data merely because  the U.S.  economy  has not recently been far from 
its steady state. The approximate constancy  of the capital-to-income  ra- 
tio over time suggests that the U.S.  economy  has indeed been in a steady 
state. 
In judging the plausibility of a large elasticity  of substitution,  keep in 
mind that an economy's  elasticity  depends not only on each industry's 
technology,  but also on the ability to move resources among industries. 
For example,  a large elasticity of substitution might arise because of in- 
ternational trade. In traditional Heckscher-Ohlin  trade theory,  interna- 
tional trade in goods  equalizes  factor prices in countries with different 
factor  endowments.  The  implication  of  this  factor-price-equalization 
theorem for growth theory is that trade increases  an economy's  ability 
to substitute capital and labor.22  When a country's endowment of capital 
increases,  it can increase exports of capital-intensive goods and increase 
imports of labor-intensive  goods  without altering the returns to either 
capital or labor. Each country has a production function that is, in effect, 
linear in capital and labor. In other words, as international trade works 
to equalize factor prices around the world, it drives the effective  elastic- 
ity of substitution in each economy  toward infinity. 
There are, however,  limits to how high the elasticity  of substitution 
can plausibly be set when trying to explain the return to capital. This can 
be seen  by considering  the return to the other factor of production- 
labor. In the neoclassical  model, the real wage,  W, is 
(15)  W = f(k)  -  f'(k)k. 
This equation, together with the production function, y = f(k),  implies 
(16)  dW/W =  (1/u)dyly. 
The wage is positively  related to income per person. In contrast to capi- 
tal, labor should be eager to migrate from poor to rich countries,  since 
larger capital stocks raise labor productivity and real wages.  Of course, 
these predictions about wages and migration are consistent  with experi- 
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ence.  The magnitude of the predicted effects,  however,  diminishes  as 
the elasticity of substitution rises. Although the elasticity of substitution 
may be greater than its traditional Cobb-Douglas  value of one, interna- 
tional experience  on factor returns cannot be explained merely by pos- 
iting that this elasticity is very large. 
In summary, the neoclassical  growth model can be evaluated by ex- 
amining how the return to capital differs across  countries.  The size of 
the predicted differentials,  however,  depends  on the production func- 
tion. The larger the elasticity of substitution between  capital and labor, 
the smaller the return differentials.  For the traditional Cobb-Douglas 
production function, the return differentials predicted by the neoclassi- 
cal model are vastly larger than are observed  in the world. 
A New View of Capital 
The neoclassical  growth model emphasizes  the accumulation of capi- 
tal over time. To use the model to shed light on international experience, 
one must have some interpretation of the term capital and some way of 
measuring the return to capital.  Traditionally,  capital is thought to be 
tangible-it  includes the economy's  stock of equipment and structures. 
The return to capital is the profit received  by the owners of equipment 
and structures. 
Over the past decade,  a new view of capital has emerged. According 
to this view,  the return to capital is a much larger fraction of national 
income  than has been traditionally believed.  This new view  alters the 
interpretation of the neoclassical  growth model and, by doing so, greatly 
expands its scope and applicability. 
The Key Role  of the Capital Share 
The previous  section  discussed  three problems  that arise when  the 
neoclassical  growth model is used  to understand international experi- 
ence. First, the model predicts less variation in income than is observed 
across  countries.  Second,  the model  predicts  a faster rate of conver- 
gence to the steady state than most studies estimate.  Third, the model 
predicts greater variation in rates of return across countries than is em- 
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Recall that these conclusions  were derived from the following  equa- 
tions: 
dy*ly* =  [/(l-  u)][ds/s  -  d(n +  g  +  8)/(n +  g  +  8)], 
=  (1 -  t)(n  + g  +  8), 
dRIR =  -  [(1 -o)/(oxr)]dyly. 
Looking at these equations for a minute yields an important insight: The 
capital share, o-,  plays a key role in each of the three problems.  The rea- 
son is that the capital share determines the shape of the production func- 
tion. To be precise, one can show that the elasticity of the average prod- 
uct of capital,f(k)/k,  with respect to amount of capital, k, is (a  -  1). The 
larger the capital share, the less  rapidly the average product declines. 
Thus, a larger value of a  implies that changes in saving have greater ef- 
fects  on steady-state  income,  that the transition to the steady  state is 
slower, and that the return to capital varies less with income. 
In my earlier calculations,  I used a conventional  estimate for the capi- 
tal share of one-third. This estimate comes from the national income ac- 
counts.  In the U.S.  economy,  capital receives  about one-third of gross 
income,  and labor receives  about two-thirds.  Approximately  the same 
is true in the other developed  economies  for which good data on factor 
income are available. 
Suppose,  however,  that the capital share were two-thirds rather than 
one-third. (For now, do not ask how this could be true. I will turn to that 
question in a moment.) Let us see how this increase in the capital share 
would affect each of the problems with neoclassical  growth theory. 
Consider  first the predicted  differences  in steady-state  income.  An 
increase  in the  capital  share,  a,  from  one-third  to  two-thirds  raises 
a/(l  -  aL)  in the first equation from one-half to two. Income now moves 
proportionately twice as much as the rate of saving, rather than half as 
much. If one country has four times the saving rate as another, it would 
have  sixteen  times  as much income  per person,  rather than only  two 
times as much. Thus, the model can now explain variation in income of 
the magnitude observed. 
This increase  in the capital share also raises the predicted impact of 
population growth,  n,  on steady-state  income.  Suppose  that (g  +  8) is 
5 percent per year, and we are comparing one country with population 
growth of  1 percent per year and another with population growth of 3 
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and 8 percent in the second.  If a/(1  -  a) is one-half, then income in the 
country with low population growth is 1.15 [(8/6)1/2] times income in the 
country with high population growth.  Yet if a/(1  -  Oa)  is two,  the pre- 
dicted multiple is 1.78 [(8/6)2]. Thus, with a larger capital share, differ- 
ences  in population growth are predicted to lead to much larger differ- 
ences in income. 
Next,  consider the predicted rate of convergence.  If the capital share, 
a,  is two-thirds rather than one-third, the implied convergence  param- 
eter,  A, is half as large.  For the other parameter values  used  earlier, 
(n +  g  +  8) = 0.06, and A = 0.02. Thus, the model now predicts the rate 
of convergence  estimated in the empirical literature. 
Finally,  consider  the implied differences  in the return to capital be- 
tween  a rich country and a poor country with incomes  that differ by a 
multiple of 10. For concreteness,  suppose that the elasticity of substitu- 
tion, u-,  is one. The last equation says that the return moves proportion- 
ately twice  as much as income if the capital share is one-third. Yet the 
return moves proportionately half as much as income if the capital share 
is two-thirds. Thus, the predicted return differential falls from a multiple 
of 100  [102]  to a multiple  of 3.16 [101/2].  And if the capital  share is larger 
than two-thirds, the predicted return differential is smaller still. 
Once again, the elasticity of substitution, ur,  is significant. If this elas- 
ticity is four rather than one, then the last equation (with a  =  2/3) says 
that the return to capital moves  proportionately one-eighth as much as 
income.  In this case,  the return in a poor country is predicted to be only 
1.33 [101/8]  times the return in a rich country. That is, if the return to capi- 
tal is 10 percent per year in rich countries,  then it should be 13 percent 
per year in poor ones. 
The predicted return differentials now appear unobjectionable.  It is 
not at all implausible to think that the emerging economies  offer returns 
of 3 percentage  points  per year higher than is available  in developed 
economies.  Keep  in mind that, for the purpose  of these  comparisons, 
the relevant return is gross of taxes and political risks. Foreign investors 
in emerging economies  might require compensation  of several percent 
per year just to compensate  them for the risk of expropriation.23 
Hence,  each  of  the  three problems  with  the neoclassical  model  of 
23.  The night this paragraph was written, the television  show "60 Minutes" ran a seg- 
ment on Nigerians posing as government officials to defraud American businessmen,  and 
the Nigerian government's  failure to prosecute  the con men. Viewers  of this show were 
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growth would disappear if the capital share were much higher than is 
conventionally  understood. As a theoretical matter, this resolution is at- 
tractive for its parsimony: it solves  three serious problems by changing 
the value of one parameter. The question is, why should one believe that 
the capital share is actually so high? 
Capital with Externalities 
One way  to raise the capital share above  one-third is to argue that 
there are positive externalities to capital. That is, some of the benefits to 
capital accumulation may accrue not to the owners of capital, but to oth- 
ers in society.  If new ideas arise as capital is built, for example,  and if 
these ideas enter the general pool of knowledge,  then even if capital re- 
ceives  only  one-third of income,  in some  sense  it deserves  credit for 
more. 
One  of  the  recent  advances  in growth  theory,  due  largely  to  Paul 
Romer, has been the ability to formalize this idea.24 Suppose  that each 
individual firm, i, in an economy  has the production function 
(17)  Yi=  okia, 
where 0 is a parameter that each firm takes as given. Also suppose that, 
because of externalities to capital, the technology  available to each firm 
is determined by the average firm's level of capital, k, so that 
(18)  0 =  kb. 
Then the production function for the economy  is 
(19)  y  =  ka+b 
In this case,  the parameter a measures the role of capital in each firm's 
production function;  it determines  the fraction  of income  paid to the 
owners  of capital. Yet the role of capital in the economy's  production 
function  is measured  by (a  +  b). For the purposes  of calibrating the 
neoclassical  growth model,  the capital share, a,  should be set equal to 
(a +  b). 
For the economy's  capital share, a,  to be much larger than the share 
of income received  by the owners of capital, the externalities  to capital 
must be large. To raise the capital share from one-third to two-thirds, 
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the externality (as measured by the parameter b) must be about as large 
as the direct benefit (as measured by the parameter a). That is, the own- 
ers of capital must be paid only half of the social return from their invest- 
ments. 
In evaluating the plausibility of such an externality,  it is important to 
note that the externality  must be geographically  limited if it is to help 
explain differences across countries.  One commonly cited external ben- 
efit to  capital  accumulation  is  the  creation  of  ideas.  Yet  since  many 
ideas,  like  public  goods,  are neither  rival nor excludable,  they  flow 
freely around the world. If externalities  to capital are to make the neo- 
classical model conform to experience,  the parameter b should be taken 
to measure the benefits to capital that are external to the firm and yet 
stop at the border. 
It is hard to know how large such externalities could be. The idea that 
capital conveys  positive externalities is plausible. It is easier to be skep- 
tical whether capital conveys  local externalities of the magnitude neces- 
sary to save the neoclassical  model from the three problems discussed 
above. 
Human  Capital 
A second  argument for a larger capital share posits  that capital is a 
much  broader concept  than is  suggested  by  the  national  income  ac- 
counts.  In the national income accounts,  capital income includes  only 
the return to physical capital, such as plant and equipment. More gener- 
ally, however,  we accumulate capital whenever  we forgo consumption 
today in order to produce more income tomorrow. In this sense,  one of 
the most important forms of capital accumulation  is the acquisition  of 
skills.  Such  human  capital  includes  both  schooling  and  on-the-job 
training. 
When applying the neoclassical  model to understand international ex- 
perience,  it seems  best to interpret the variable k as including all kinds 
of capital. Thus, the capital share, a,  should include the return to both 
physical and human capital. Yet, the return to human capital is not part 
of capital income in the national income accounts.  Instead,  it is part of 
labor income. Therefore, if we use the national income accounts to cali- 
brate the neoclassical  model,  we  are likely to substantially  underesti- 
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To gauge the true capital share, it is necessary  to decide how much of 
labor income should be credited to human capital. To do this, we might 
look at the minimum wage, which is roughly the return to labor with min- 
imal human capital.  In the United  States  the minimum wage  today  is 
about one-third of the average wage.  This fact suggests  that the return 
to human capital is about two-thirds of labor income,  or almost one-half 
of national income. 
Another way to estimate the human capital share of income is to look 
at the return to schooling. A large literature in labor economics  finds that 
each  year of  schooling  raises  a worker's  wage  by at least  8 percent. 
Moreover,  the average  American  has about thirteen years  of  school- 
ing.25  Together these facts imply that the average worker earns almost 
three times as much as he would without any human capital. Again, this 
suggests  that about two-thirds of the average worker's  earnings is the 
return to his education,  and that human capital earns almost one-half of 
national income. 
Adding this estimate of the human capital share to the physical capital 
share of one-third, we find that the income  from all forms of capital is 
about 80 percent of national income.  Hence,  when calibrating the neo- 
classical model, the capital share, a,  should be set at about 0.8. For rea- 
sons already discussed,  a parameter value of this magnitude makes the 
neoclassical  model conform much more closely  to international expe- 
rience. 
Reinterpreting capital to include human capital,  however,  creates  a 
new problem: Data from the national income accounts  correspond less 
well to the variables in the model.  Most of the accumulation in human 
capital takes the form of forgone wages of students in school or workers 
in training. The national income accounts  do not include this expendi- 
ture on human capital in either measured investment or measured GDP. 
Moreover, most direct expenditures on human capital, such as on teach- 
ers  and  books,  enter  the  national  income  accounts  as  consumption 
rather than investment. 
Focusing  on human capital does  help to resolve  an earlier problem: 
the international comparison of rates of return. There is a large literature 
estimating the returns to schooling around the world. George Psacharo- 
poulos  summarizes  results from over  60 countries.26 The findings are 
25.  Psacharopoulos (1985, table 3) and StatisticalAbstract  of the United States,  1993, 
table 230. 
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consistent  with the neoclassical  model and its prediction of diminishing 
marginal product.  The  measured  return to  schooling  is  consistently 
larger in poor countries than in rich countries. 
Acknowledging  the role of human capital can also help explain why 
capital does not flow from rich to poor countries. Because human capital 
does not serve well as collateral, borrowing to finance human capital in- 
vestment  is often difficult, even in rich countries with developed  finan- 
cial institutions.  It is not surprising that resources do not flow into poor 
countries to help them finance investment  in human capital. Moreover, 
once  we  acknowledge  this capital market imperfection,  the failure of 
physical  capital to flow is less  puzzling.  Because  human and physical 
capital are complementary inputs in production, imperfections in the fi- 
nancing of human capital impede the international movement  of physi- 
cal capital  as well.27 
Incorporating human capital investment  into the neoclassical  model 
also raises the proportion of international variation that the model can 
explain. As mentioned earlier, a cross-country  regression of income per 
person on saving and population growth rates yields an R2 of 59 percent. 
If a measure of saving in the form of human capital is added to this re- 
gression,  the R2 rises to 78 percent.28 Put simply, most international dif- 
ferences  in living standards can be explained by differences  in accumu- 
lation of both human and physical capital. 
Hence,  broadening the meaning of capital to include human as well as 
physical capital can help make the neoclassical  growth model consistent 
with international experience.  In this case, one can argue for a large cap- 
ital share without invoking externalities  of any sort. Of course,  exter- 
nalities to capital, either physical or human, could still exist.  If so, the 
implied capital share is higher still. But externalities  are not necessary 
for the capital share to be large. Either with or without externalities,  the 
role of capital in economic  growth appears much greater than tradition- 
ally has been assumed. 
Theories of Endogenous Growth 
So far, my attention has centered on the neoclassical  growth model. I 
have taken the conservative  position that we should begin with this stan- 
27.  Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
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dard model,  see what problems arise when we go to the data, and then 
try to make the minimal changes necessary  to make the model work. If 
we are willing to give the capital share a value much larger than tradition- 
ally has been assumed,  the major problems with this model disappear, 
and the model becomes  a useful framework for understanding interna- 
tional differences in economic  growth. 
Yet  much of the recent  literature on economic  growth has taken a 
more radical approach. The neoclassical  model, even with capital inter- 
preted broadly, implies that growth in income per person eventually ap- 
proaches g, the exogenous  rate of technological  progress. Although the 
model can explain international differences in growth rates as the result 
of convergence  to different steady  states,  it cannot explain the persis- 
tence  of  economic  growth  throughout  most  of  the  world.  Persistent 
growth is built into the neoclassical  model in a way that is simple but not 
terribly illuminating. The goal of much recent work in growth theory, 
therefore,  has been to develop  models  of persistent  growth that avoid 
the assumption of exogenous  advances in technology.  Hence,  this work 
goes by the name endogenous  growth theory. 
The Basic  Model 
The idea behind endogenous  growth theory can be seen most easily 
by considering the production function,  Y = AK. This production func- 
tion has the property of constant  returns to the accumulated factor.  If 
we double the amount of capital, we double the amount of output. To 
see what this implies for economic  growth, consider  the accumulation 
equation: 
(20)  K=  sY-8iK. 
This equation, together with the Y = AK production function, implies 
(21)  Y/Y=  k/K=  sA-8. 
As long as sA >  8, income grows forever, even without the assumption 
of exogenous  technological  progress. 
Thus, a simple change in the production function can dramatically al- 
ter the predictions  about economic  growth. In the neoclassical  model, 
saving  leads  to  growth  temporarily,  but eventually  the  economy  ap- 
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rate.  By  contrast,  in this endogenous  growth  model,  saving  leads  to 
growth forever. 
The endogenous  growth model can be viewed as a limiting case of the 
neoclassical  model. As I showed  above,  the rate of convergence  to the 
steady state in the neoclassical  model depends on the capital share. As 
the capital share, a, goes to one, the rate of convergence,  X, goes to zero. 
The basic endogenous  growth model is, in essence,  the limiting case of 
the neoclassical  model in which convergence  is so slow  as to be non- 
existent.  In the endogenous  growth model, the transitional dynamics of 
the neoclassical  model last forever. 
This limiting case has two notable properties. First, differences in sav- 
ing rates across  countries  lead to increasingly  large differences  in in- 
come over time. Second,  large differences  in income are not associated 
with differences  in the return to capital.  Thus,  the world can contain 
great disparities  in income  without  any incentive  for capital to move 
from rich to poor countries. 
In some  sense,  the  endogenous  growth  model  is  not  really  novel. 
Solow  himself pointed out in his original article that if the production 
function  were  not  well  behaved,  his model  might not  have  a steady 
state.29 Solow  noted that, in this case,  capital accumulation can lead to 
perpetual growth.  The  innovation  in endogenous  growth theory  is to 
make this case canonical. 
The question is, how do we interpret the variable K in the production 
function,  Y = AK?  If K is seen as including only the economy's  stock of 
plant and equipment,  then it is natural to assume  diminishing returns. 
That is probably why Solow  chose  not to emphasize  the possibility  of 
endogenous  growth in his model.  Yet if we interpret K more broadly, 
then the assumption  of  constant  returns to capital is more palatable. 
Thus,  the literature on endogenous  growth has often relied on capital 
with externalities and human capital when making the case for constant 
returns. 
The most appealing way of interpreting the endogenous  growth model 
is to view knowledge as a type of capital. It is clear that scientific discov- 
eries build on previous scientific discoveries.  Knowledge  is used to pro- 
duce knowledge.  Compared to other forms of capital, the production of 
knowledge  seems  less  likely to exhibit diminishing returns. Indeed,  as 
Paul Romer and, more recently,  Michael Kremer have emphasized,  if 
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we look over very long spans of history it appears that growth has accel- 
erated somewhat over time.30  The production of knowledge might even 
exhibit increasing returns. 
It is worthwhile  to distinguish here between  knowledge  and human 
capital.  Although  the two  terms are sometimes  treated as synonyms, 
there is an important difference.  Knowledge  refers to society's  under- 
standing about how the world works.  Human capital refers to the re- 
sources expended transmitting this understanding to the labor force. Put 
crudely, knowledge is the quality of society's  textbooks;  human capital 
is the amount of time that has been spent reading them. Even if the accu- 
mulation of knowledge does not encounter diminishing returns, it seems 
likely that the accumulation of human capital does. The best case for en- 
dogenous  growth,  therefore,  relies  on  knowledge  rather than human 
capital as the source of perpetual growth. 
Bells  and  Whistles 
The  Y =  AK model is the simplest example  of endogenous  growth, 
but it does  not do justice  to the large literature on endogenous  growth 
theory. The literature has moved two steps further. The first step was to 
develop  models with more than one sector of production; for instance, 
one sector might produce goods and services  while another sector pro- 
duces  innovations  in  technology.  The  second  step  was  to  develop 
models  that incorporate  the  microeconomic  decisions  behind  the  re- 
search process.  Both are steps in the direction of offering a more explicit 
description  of how  economic  growth arises from the accumulation  of 
knowledge. 
To see what can be learned from models with more than one sector, 
consider  the  following  example  of  endogenous  growth  based  on  the 
work of Hirofumi Uzawa,  Robert Lucas,  and Casey  Mulligan and Xa- 
vier Sala-i-Martin.31  The economy  has two sectors: manufacturing firms 
and research universities.  Firms produce goods and services,  which are 
used for consumption and capital accumulation.  Universities  produce a 
factor of production called knowledge,  which is then freely used in both 
sectors. The economy  is described by the production function for firms, 
30.  See Romer (1986) and Kremer (1993). 
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the production function for universities,  and the capital accumulation 
equation: 
(22)  Y=  F[K,(1  - u)HL], 
(23)  H  =  g(u)H, 
(24)  K=  sY-85K, 
where u is the fraction of the labor force in universities,  H is the stock of 
knowledge,  and g' -  0. The rest of the notation is standard. As before, 
the production function for the manufacturing firms is assumed to be ho- 
mogeneous  of degree one in its two arguments. 
This model is a cousin of the Y = AK model. In particular, this econ- 
omy exhibits constant returns to scale in the accumulated factors of pro- 
duction. If we double the inputs of capital and knowledge,  we double the 
output of both sectors.  Like the Y = AK model, this model can generate 
perpetual growth without the assumption of exogenous  shifts in the pro- 
duction function. 
This model is also a cousin of the neoclassical  growth model. For any 
constant u, knowledge,  H, grows at the constant rate g, and the model 
is exactly the one Solow analyzed in 1956. Thus this model has the tran- 
sitional dynamics of the neoclassical  model. When the stock of capital is 
low relative to the stock of knowledge  (that is, when K/HL is below its 
steady-state  value),  the economy's  production  of goods  and services 
grows more quickly. In contrast to the Y = AK model, this endogenous 
growth model can explain conditional convergence. 
There are two key decision variables in this model. As in the neoclas- 
sical model, the fraction of output used for saving and investment deter- 
mines the stock of capital. In addition, the fraction of labor used in uni- 
versities determines the stock of knowledge.  Both s and u affect the level 
of income,  although only u affects the long-run growth rate. Thus, this 
model of endogenous  growth takes a small step toward showing which 
societal decisions  determine the rate of technological  change.32 
Yet even this endogenous growth model tells only a rudimentary story 
about the creation of knowledge.  If one thinks about research for even a 
32.  For  a discussion  of  decisionmaking  and dynamics  in this  kind of  endogenous 
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moment, three facts become apparent. First, even though knowledge is 
largely a public good,  much research is done in firms that are driven by 
the profit motive.  Second,  research  is profitable because  innovations 
give firms temporary monopolies,  either because of the patent system or 
because there is an advantage to being first. Third, when one firm inno- 
vates,  other firms build on that innovation in order to produce the next 
generation of innovations.  These  (essentially  microeconomic)  facts are 
not  easily  connected  with  the  (essentially  macroeconomic)  growth 
models discussed  so far. 
Some  recent work on endogenous  growth is aimed at incorporating 
these  facts  about research and development  by melding the theory of 
monopolistic  competition into the theory of growth.33  One virtue of this 
class of endogenous growth models is that it offers a detailed description 
of the process of innovation. In linking technological  change and market 
power,  these  models  harken back to themes  that Joseph  Schumpeter 
emphasized many years ago.34  The recent formalization is valuable both 
for clarifying these old ideas and for providing a framework in which to 
examine the welfare properties of equilibria. 
Whither Endogenous  Growth? 
Like many theories, the theory of endogenous growth has its place but 
has been oversold  by its advocates.  Its value is twofold.  First, it helps 
explain the existence  of worldwide  technological  progress,  which  the 
neoclassical  growth model takes as given. Second,  it offers a more real- 
istic description of research and development. 
Yet for practical macroeconomists  trying to understand international 
differences,  the payoff  from endogenous  growth  theory  is  not  clear. 
Models that emphasize  unmeasurable variables such as knowledge  are 
hard to bring to the data. It is not surprising, therefore, that these models 
have appealed to more theoretically inclined economists,  and that there 
have been few attempts to evaluate these models empirically. 
Even  though  knowledge  is  undeniably  important  for  economic 
growth, theories of the creation of knowledge may be of little help in ex- 
plaining international differences  in growth rates.  Knowledge,  as op- 
33.  For example,  see Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and 
Howitt (1992). 
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posed to capital, travels around the world fairly quickly. State-of-the-art 
textbooks  are available in the poorest countries.  Even when a firm has 
some monopoly power over an innovation,  this lasts only a short time, 
after which the innovation  becomes  a worldwide  public good.  For un- 
derstanding international experience,  the best assumption may be that 
all countries have access  to the same pool of knowledge,  but differ by 
the degree to which they take advantage of this knowledge by investing 
in physical and human capital. 
It is ultimately  an empirical issue  whether  capital or knowledge  is 
more  important  in  explaining  international  differences  in  economic 
growth. In a recent paper, Alwyn Young sheds light on this question by 
examining in detail the spectacular growth of Hong Kong,  Singapore, 
South Korea, and Taiwan.3s From 1966 to 1990 income per person grew 
by more than 7 percent per year in each of these countries. Young shows 
that this exceptional growth can be traced to large increases in measured 
factor inputs: labor-force participation, educational attainment, and the 
capital stock.  Growth in total factor productivity-which  measures the 
rate of improvement over time in the production function-was  not un- 
usually  high.  For  understanding  these  growth  miracles,  endogenous 
growth theory appears unnecessary. 
Empirical  Studies  of Economic  Growth 
One hallmark of recent work on economic  growth, in contrast to the 
work of the 1950s and 1960s, is its empirical emphasis.  Largely because 
of the important work of Summers and Heston,  international data suita- 
ble for cross-sectional  analysis  are now available for most countries.36 
These data have allowed systematic  examination of the differences  be- 
tween  economies  that have  experienced  rapid growth and those  that 
have not. 
Some  Findings 
The typical empirical paper on economic  growth chooses  a sample of 
countries and then runs a cross-sectional  regression.  On the left-hand 
35.  Young (1995). 
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side is each country's  average growth rate over a long period.  On the 
right-hand side is a set of variables expected  to determine that growth 
rate. The variables change from study to study, and the interpretations 
of  the  results  differ,  but  the  basic  setup  is  usually  pretty  much  the 
same.37 
Although it is impossible  to summarize this vast literature, some  of 
the findings are worth noting: 
-A  low initial level  of income  is associated  with a high subsequent 
growth rate when other variables are held constant. This is the finding of 
conditional convergence,  discussed  earlier. 
-The  share of output allocated to investment is positively  associated 
with growth. 
-Various  measures of human capital, such as enrollment rates in pri- 
mary and secondary schools,  are positively  associated  with growth. 
-Population  growth (or fertility) is negatively associated with growth 
in income per person. 
-Political  instability,  as measured by the frequency  of revolutions, 
coups,  or wars, is negatively associated  with growth. 
-Countries  with more distorted markets, as measured by the black 
market premium on foreign exchange  or other impediments  to trade, 
tend to have lower growth rates. 
-Countries  with better developed  financial markets,  as measured, 
for instance,  by the size of liquid assets relative to income,  tend to have 
higher growth rates. 
Each of these  findings has been confirmed independently  in several 
studies.  Most of them depend to some extent on which other variables 
are included in the regression. This sensitivity to specification is not sur- 
prising in light of the serious multicollinearity problem (which I discuss 
below). 
It is easy to reconcile these results with existing theories of growth. In 
terms of the neoclassical  model, these regressions  show a tendency for 
convergence  toward a steady  state  that is determined  by the control 
variables.  And,  as discussed  above,  endogenous  growth models  with 
37.  For a sampling from the huge literature estimating cross-country  growth regres- 
sions,  see Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Dowrick and Nguyen  (1989), Barro (1991), De 
Long and Summers (1991,  1992a, 1992b, 1993), Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991), Fi- 
scher (1991, 1993), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Levine and Renelt (1992), and King 
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more than one sector are consistent  with a similar interpretation. Even 
the signs on the control variables make sense.  What economist  doubts 
that growth is fostered by high investment,  widespread education,  low 
population growth, political stability, free markets, and well-developed 
financial institutions? 
Yet  despite  their success  in uncovering  some  interesting and inter- 
pretable regularities, cross-country  growth regressions are not unassail- 
able as a tool for learning about the determinants of growth. Three prob- 
lems in particular affect this entire literature. 
The Simultaneity Problem 
The most obvious  problem with cross-country  growth regressions  is 
simultaneity-the  fact that the right-hand-side variables are not exoge- 
nous,  but are jointly  determined  with the growth rate.  For example, 
there is a strong, positive  correlation between  investment  and growth. 
But does this imply that high investment  causes  high growth, that high 
growth causes  high investment,  or that some third variable causes  both 
high investment  and high growth? The same question can be posed for 
population growth,  human capital, political  stability,  and all the other 
variables commonly used in growth regressions. 
The standard econometric  solution to simultaneity is to follow the ad- 
vice of the Cowles  Commission:  find exogenous  variables to use as in- 
struments. The problem is that there are few,  if any,  such variables in 
cross-country  data sets. 
When looking for instruments,  it is easy  to fall prey to temptation. 
Some  economists  are tempted to treat political  variables,  such as the 
number of revolutions and coups, as if they were exogenous.  But politi- 
cal scientists  are tempted to call economic  growth exogenous  and put 
political instability on the left-hand side. Some economists  are tempted 
to treat lagged variables as exogenous.  But a variable is not necessarily 
exogenous  just  because  it is predetermined.38 For empirical work on 
economic  growth, the advice of the Cowles  Commission does not seem 
feasible. 
38.  Anyone  who thinks that predetermined variables are naturally good instruments 
should ponder the following  problem: A person regresses  the quantity of apples on the 
price of apples, instrumenting with yesterday's  price of apples. Has he identified the sup- 
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Where does  this conclusion  leave  us? Very simply,  with a bunch of 
correlations among important endogenous  variables. The cross-country 
data can never establish, for instance, the direction of causality between 
investment  and growth.  Yet  the correlation  between  investment  and 
growth is an interesting and useful fact. It says that any explanation of 
international experience  must be consistent  with these  two  variables 
moving strongly together.  In other words,  correlations among endoge- 
nous variables can rule out theories that fail to produce the correlations, 
and they can thereby raise our confidence  in theories  that do produce 
them, but these correlations can never establish causality beyond a rea- 
sonable doubt. 
The Multicollinearity Problem 
Another problem with interpreting cross-country  regressions is multi- 
collinearity-the  strong correlation among all the right-hand-side vari- 
ables. In some ways, multicollinearity is more a pernicious problem than 
simultaneity, for its effects are less obvious. 
There is no doubt that multicollinearity is severe in cross-country  re- 
gressions.  High-growth  countries  have  higher  rates  of  investment, 
higher enrollment in primary schools,  higher enrollment in secondary 
schools,  higher rates of literacy, lower rates of population growth, more 
developed financial markets, and fewer revolutions and coups than low- 
growth economies.  As a rough approximation,  those  countries  that do 
things right do  most  things  right, and those  countries  that do things 
wrong do most things wrong. 
At first, multicollinearity might not seem like a problem, for multiple 
regression  is  supposed  to deal with it automatically.  Under  standard 
econometric  assumptions,  multicollinearity reduces  the precision  with 
which coefficients  are estimated,  but it does not bias the coefficients  or 
standard errors. Thus,  it might appear that multicollinearity  does  not 
contaminate the inferences drawn from cross-country  regressions. 
Yet there are two reasons  to doubt that multiple regression  does  in 
fact deal well with multicollinearity.  The first reason is that multiple re- 
gression treats each country as if it were an independent  observation. 
For the reported standard errors to be correct,  the residual for Canada 
must be uncorrelated with the residual for the United States. If country 
residuals are in fact correlated, as is plausible, then the data most likely 
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is,  statistical  significance is overstated.  The reported standard errors, 
therefore, cannot be relied upon to warn us about the problem of multi- 
collinearity  .3 
The second  reason to doubt that multiple regression  deals well with 
multicollinearity is the prevalence of measurement error in international 
data sets. Everyone  who uses cross-country  data admits that many vari- 
ables are crude proxies at best. Yet the implications of this fact are rarely 
acknowledged.  It is a standard econometric  result that measurement er- 
ror tends to bias downward the coefficient on the variable measured with 
error. At the same time, it can bias upward the coefficients  on variables 
correlated with the variable measured with error, for these  other vari- 
ables stand in for the error-prone variable.  Hence,  when growth rates 
are regressed on a group of crude proxy variables that exhibit substantial 
multicollinearity,  the  set  of  coefficients  largely  reflects  the  differing 
measurement errors in the right-hand-side variables. 
Let us consider a specific example.  In a series of provocative  papers, 
Bradford De Long and Lawrence  Summers argue that the social return 
to equipment investment is very high.40  This finding is based largely on 
cross-country  growth  regressions  with  equipment  investment  among 
the control variables. From a large coefficient on equipment investment, 
they conclude  that equipment investment  yields  substantial externali- 
ties, and that government policy should target this form of capital accu- 
mulation. 
De Long and Summers also find in their sample that secondary school 
enrollment has an insignificant negative coefficient,  but they choose  not 
to emphasize this result. They note that secondary school enrollment is 
"not a very good proxy" for investment in human capital. They go on to 
explain that "it is premature to conclude that education is not important: 
education almost surely is important. Instead, the lack of significance of 
our human capital investment  proxies in our cross-national  regressions 
should most likely be attributed to the large divergence  between  mea- 
sured schooling and actual skills learned."41 
This interpretation makes sense.  But do the implications of measure- 
39.  De Long and Summers (1991) tried to address the possibility of spatial correlation 
between  the residuals in cross-country  growth regressions  and were surprised that they 
found little evidence of it. More recently, Elliot (1993) has found such evidence.  He reports 
that standard errors corrected for spatial correlation are substantially larger than the un- 
corrected standard errors usually used. 
40.  De Long and Summers (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993). 
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ment error stop at the schooling coefficient? Almost certainly not. If in- 
vestment  in human capital is important but hard to measure,  then it is 
possible that equipment investment is also serving as a proxy for invest- 
ment in human capital. Because  equipment requires workers to operate 
it, economies  with highly skilled workers may attract more equipment 
investment than economies  with less skilled workers. Thus, it is hard to 
know whether the coefficient  on equipment investment  reflects a truly 
large rate of return, or merely the combination  of measurement  error 
and multicollinearity. 
I am not picking on De Long and Summers because their work is par- 
ticularly egregious.  Quite the opposite is true. These authors are keenly 
aware of the pitfalls in interpreting cross-country  growth regressions 
and they do more than most to try to avoid them. But they,  like others 
running these regressions,  are limited by the available data. 
The Degrees-of-Freedom  Problem 
One goal of empirical work on economic  growth is to establish  the 
conditions that are associated  with rapid growth. Is the key to growth a 
high rate of equipment investment?  Political stability? Well-developed 
financial institutions? Stable money growth? Low inflation? More engi- 
neers than lawyers? Or some variable yet to be investigated?42 
There is no limit to the possibilities-and  that itself raises one more 
problem. There are only about one hundred countries on which to run 
cross-country growth regressions.  As a matter of econometric  logic, one 
hundred observations  can estimate  only one hundred coefficients  (and 
far fewer than that with any degree of accuracy).  There are too few de- 
grees of freedom to answer all the questions being asked. 
Of course, no individual study ever includes one hundred variables on 
the right-hand side of a cross-country  growth regression.  Yet including 
only a subset of variables does not help matters much. It just means that 
the results  of the study are contingent  upon what variables the study 
chooses  to exclude. 
There is no easy  solution to this degrees-of-freedom  problem. In the 
end, there appears to be little choice but to admit the limitations of cross- 
42.  See, respectively,  De Long and Summers (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993), Barro (1991), 
King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Fischer (1991, 1993), and 
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country growth regressions.  It is not that we have to stop asking so many 
questions  about economic  growth.  We just  have to stop expecting  the 
international data to give us all the answers.43 
The Future of Growvth  Empirics 
Although  I applaud the empirical emphasis  in recent  work on eco- 
nomic growth,  I am not sanguine about the future of this work. There 
are two problems working in concert: the subtlety of the theories and the 
limitations of the data. 
When the field of economic  growth was revived about a decade ago, 
some people argued that the international data offered a way of rejecting 
some theories  in favor of others.  The neoclassical  model predicts con- 
vergence,  whereas  the  Y =  AK endogenous  growth model  does  not. 
Since large samples of countries exhibit little evidence  of convergence, 
the data seemed to favor the endogenous  growth model. 
In actuality, things are not so simple. If different countries are allowed 
to have different steady states, then the neoclassical  model predicts con- 
ditional convergence,  which is found in the data. Conditional conver- 
gence,  however,  is also consistent  with more sophisticated  endogenous 
growth models  that exhibit  some form of transitional dynamics.  Once 
we admit that growth theories have subtle implications, we are forced to 
conclude  that  cross-country  regressions  cannot  easily  distinguish 
among them. 
Using these  regressions  to decide  how to foster growth is also most 
likely a hopeless  task.  Simultaneity,  multicollinearity,  and limited de- 
grees of freedom are important practical problems for anyone trying to 
draw inferences from international data. Policymakers who want to pro- 
mote growth would not go far wrong ignoring most of the vast literature 
43.  One approach to the degrees-of-freedom  problem is to move from cross-sectional 
to panel data. See, for example, Islam (1995) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, chap. 12). 
Including more frequent observations  on each country increases the number of degrees of 
freedom. Yet the amount of information being added is not obvious,  for the new observa- 
tions are not independent  of the old ones.  Moreover,  this information comes  at the cost 
of introducing another problem: the business  cycle.  Distinguishing  growth effects  from 
business-cycle  effects  is difficult, for many of the determinants of long-run growth (such 
as investment) fluctuate strongly over the business  cycle.  Given the traditional view that 
short-run fluctuations and long-run growth are fundamentally different phenomena,  it is 
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reporting growth regressions.  Basic  theory,  shrewd  observation,  and 
common sense are surely more reliable guides for policy. 
Where  Do We Stand? 
The purpose of economic  theory is to take a complicated  world, ab- 
stract from many details, and express the key economic  relationships in 
a way that enhances understanding. From this standpoint, the neoclassi- 
cal model is still the most useful theory of growth we have. It will con- 
tinue to be the first growth model taught to students and the first growth 
model used by policy analysts. 
The modern interpretation of this model,  however,  differs from that 
of twenty  years ago.  There is an increasing consensus  that the role of 
capital in economic  growth should be interpreted more broadly. Either 
because capital accumulation conveys  positive externalities,  or because 
labor income is largely the return to human capital, or for both reasons, 
the capital share is likely much greater than the traditional estimate  of 
one-third derived from the national income accounts.  If the neoclassical 
model  is to explain  the international experience,  a capital share of at 
least two-thirds seems necessary. 
Recent work in endogenous  growth has shown how to model techno- 
logical progress,  which is exogenous  in the neoclassical  growth model. 
Although endogenous growth models are often presented as alternatives 
to the neoclassical  model, they can also be viewed as complements.  En- 
dogenous  growth models provide a plausible description of worldwide 
advances  in knowledge.  The  neoclassical  growth model  takes  world- 
wide technological  advances  as given and provides a plausible descrip- 
tion of international differences. 
If one  accepts  the neoclassical  conclusion  that the accumulation  of 
capital (broadly interpreted) is the key  to international differences  in 
economic  growth, one is naturally led to ask why some countries  save 
and invest  so much more than others.  Little progress has been made in 
answering this important question.  Recent  work on economic  growth 
has emphasized  innovations  in the production  side  of the model,  ap- 
pending standard theories  of the household  to explain the saving deci- 
sion. Much of the growth literature continues  to rely on the most basic 
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sumption literature has rejected this model of household  behavior.  At 
this point,  advances  in the  study  of consumption  and saving  may do 
more to further understanding of economic  growth than advances  in 
growth theory as conventionally  practiced. 
The implications of recent work on economic  growth for policymak- 
ers are far from clear.  Obviously,  if capital accumulation  is the key to 
growth,  then accumulating  capital more rapidly will raise the growth 
rate. Just as obviously,  political stability will raise growth by encourag- 
ing investment  both by domestic  residents and from abroad. Yet some 
recent work on economic  growth suggests  that a more activist govern- 
ment could be beneficial.  If certain types of capital yield large positive 
externalities,  then policymakers should try to direct resources in this di- 
rection. The problem is that economists  have not produced a persuasive 
way of measuring the magnitude of these externalities.  Relying on esti- 
mates from cross-country  regressions  (or on the judgments of the politi- 
cal process)  will likely lead to haphazard policy,  which is surely worse 
than no policy at all. Without a solution to this measurement problem, 
modern growth theory does not offer any clear policy prescriptions.  In 
my view,  policymakers  who want to foster economic  growth would do 
well to heed the first rule for physicians: do no harm. This may seem like 
a modest conclusion  from an ambitious literature. But sometimes  mod- 
esty is all that economists  have a right to offer. 
APPENDIX 
The Rate  of Convergence  to the Steady  State 
THIS APPENDIX  derives the rate of convergence  to the steady state in the 
Solow version of the neoclassical  growth model.  Begin with the capital 
accumulation equation: 
(Al)  dkldt =  sf(k)  -  (n + g  +  8)k. 
Now take the first-order Taylor expansion  of the right-hand side of this 
equation around the steady-state  capital stock,  k*. This yields 
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Substitute for s using the steady-state  condition sf(k*) =  (n + g  +  5)k* 
This gives 
(A3)  dk/dt =  {[f'(k*)k*lf(k*)]  -  1}(n + g  +  8)(k -  k*). 
If capital earns its marginal product,  then f' (k*)k*If(k*) is the steady- 
state capital share, (x. Therefore, 
(A4)  dkldt =  -X(k  -  k*), 
where 
A =  (1 -o)(n  +  g  +  8). 
To show that income converges  to its steady-state  level at the same rate 
as capital,  note that y  = f(k).  Therefore,  the following  first-order ap- 
proximations hold: 
(A5)  dyldt =f'(k*)dkldt, 
(A6)  y -  Y* =f'(k*)(k  -  k*). 
By substitution, 
(A7)  dyldt  =  -X(y  -  y*). 
Thus, income converges  to its steady state at rate A. Notice  that this re- 
sult does not depend on any specific functional form for the production 
function, f(k). 
In interpreting the neoclassical  growth model,  some authors have as- 
serted that convergence  follows  from the property of diminishing mar- 
ginal product. This interpretation is not correct, at least for this most ba- 
sic  version  of  the  model.  The  second  derivative  of  the  production 
function, f',  measures the extent of diminishing marginal product; this 
plays no role in determining the rate of convergence,  X. It is more accu- 
rate to say that convergence  arises here from the property of diminishing 
average  p,roduct. As the capital stock rises,  depreciation  rises propor- 
tionately,  but income  and investment  rise  less  than proportionately; 
thus, a higher level of capital leads to a lower growth rate of capital. Comments 
and Discussion 
Edmund  S. Phelps:  This paper gives  some noteworthy  support to the 
wisdom that the phenomenon  of poor countries in the world can be ex- 
plained by the importance of human capital. Having little human capital, 
they invest little in tangible capital. If virtually all income is attributable 
to this capital, human and nonhuman, a dearth of human capital has a 
devastating  effect  on national potential  output.  Moreover,  the impor- 
tance of human capital (on top of the already measured importance of 
nonhuman capital) in the production function  is a serious  drag on the 
speed with which a low-income  economy  can climb to its steady-state 
income level; and it adds mightily to the sensitivity  of the steady-state 
income level to a country's  saving-to-income  ratio. 
Becoming  very bold, Mankiw adds that not much of the difference in 
income from country to country is to be accounted for by disparities in 
technological  knowledge.  Textbooks,  blueprints, and chemical formu- 
las travel fast over the world, evidently at low transmission costs.  So in 
the author's view,  it is ultimately human capital that holds back a coun- 
try-though  he agrees with the recent econometric  studies finding that a 
country can boost its growth path with "political stability, free markets, 
and well-developed  financial [intermediaries]." 
For me this paper is a model of exposition  and is destined to have a 
long life. Yet I see places in which Mankiw's analysis badly needs to be 
corrected or supplemented.  One of these is his apparent conception  of 
the function of human capital, defined as the resource cost  incurred in 
teaching and learning the world's stock of knowledge.  He appears to see 
it entirely as a factor of production,  analogous to the stocks of tangible 
capital. Thus he posits an elasticity of true national income with respect 
to that human stock,  to be measured by labor's share of true income, 
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that is entirely analogous to the capital elasticity of output. This is a very 
static and deterministic view. 
The alternative view is that all or most persons in the labor force could 
forget everything they had learned beyond the ninth grade, say, without 
putting much of a dent in today's  output. First of all, most schooling  is 
learning how to learn-which  fosters the ability to understand a descrip- 
tion of an innovative  technique,  such as a new tool or a new chemical, 
or understand legislation setting out regulations or prohibitions affecting 
some industrial activity. Thus education facilitates the adoption and dis- 
semination of technical advances  and, more generally,  the exploitation 
of market opportunities. This theme is developed  in a paper by Richard 
Nelson  and myself. I Second,  much of our learning is precautionary, and 
seemingly redundant, because we do not know when we are young, and 
our opportunity costs are low, what job or sequence ofjobs  will be most 
in demand over our working life. The best econometric  evidence for this 
view so far is the finding that the stock of human capital contributes neg- 
atively to a country's  productivity level but positively  to the rate of im- 
provement in its productivity.2 Certainly in communist Eastern Europe, 
where the demand for innovation was weak, having massive human cap- 
ital did not appear to help much at all. There is also microeconomic  evi- 
dence in longitudinal studies finding that entrepreneurs show outside re- 
turns from additional education.3 
One consequence  of this alternative model concerns  the importance 
of human capital. The disadvantage posed by having low human capital, 
this model says, is that it impedes the ability to implement promptly and 
widely  the  successive  advances  in the best-practice  technology.  The 
country is always behind the curve. Thus we may assume that a country 
is farther behind the best-practice frontier, the lower is its human capital 
and the faster that the frontier is advancing. If only technological  prog- 
ress would stop, the returns on much of the human capital would drop, 
and the countries disadvantaged in human capital could then converge 
to the frontier (perhaps very nearly at Mankiw's original 4 percent rate). 
The alternative view also has implications for the demand for human 
capital. Why is it that several countries  have,  in only a few  short dec- 
ades,  experienced  a rapid accumulation  of human capital-the  Asian 
1.  Nelson  and Phelps (1966). 
2.  Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). 
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miracle economies-while  other countries at about the same place in the 
poverty ranking have not? Surely the answer is the emergence  of entre- 
preneurship, encouraged and sanctioned by the government.  To an im- 
portant degree,  I suggest,  a dearth of human capital is found in those 
countries  where there is a low demand for it, its reward being meager 
because  the  entrepreneurs  who  might  introduce  best-practice  tech- 
niques and enter new markets are not permitted or emboldened to do so 
by the government and the prevailing economic  philosophy. 
This observation leads to another area where I feel the paper falls a bit 
short. A student in Budapest or Moscow  could come away from this pa- 
per with the impression  that, although noninterference  with exchange 
rates and other niceties  of liberal economic  policy  may be rather im- 
portant for a government to observe,  whether ownership and control of 
industry is primarily capitalist or socialist should not be a vital consider- 
ation in a country's strategy for a high rate of growth. The c-word barely 
appears in the paper. Unless  I missed it, the postwar experience  of the 
socialist countries in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia is not considered 
significant. 
If the new wave  of research on economic  growth is to graduate to a 
really useful endeavor,  it has to introduce the factors that have become 
prominent in discussions  of the road back to capitalism in eastern Eu- 
rope: tax rates on enterprise profits and payrolls,  the size of the public 
enterprise sector,  red tape and corruption in the government's  licenses 
and contracts to the private sector,  impediments to shareowners'  exer- 
cise of enterprise control, and various other property rights. 
This gap in the paper is frustrating. We Western economists  should be 
sending messages  to countries  where corporate ownership and control 
are now crucial issues.  Yet if this paper is a guide,  present-day  main- 
stream research on economic  growth is cut off from the searching analy- 
sis of the crucial contributions of key capitalist institutions for economic 
growth that has been touched off by the events in eastern Europe in the 
1990s. However,  it is not too late to start filling this gap. 
Paul M. Romer:  Greg Mankiw and I agree on many issues  concerning 
growth, but it will be more useful if I focus here on the areas in which we 
disagree. Our most obvious disagreement is apparently over a statement 
of fact. Mankiw argues that technology  is a public good that is available 
everywhere  in the world. I argue that there is ample evidence  that this 314  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
assertion  is wrong.  But our disagreement  here is not really about the 
facts.  Mankiw's position  is not that his claim is literally true, but that 
it is close  enough for macroeconomics.  What constitutes  close  enough 
depends on what one is trying to accomplish-getting  the answers right 
or catering to a target audience. 
Our differing positions  on the nature of technology  are derived from 
a more basic disagreement about strategies for constructing macroeco- 
nomic models of growth. Mankiw believes  that the neoclassical  model 
built on the foundation of the public-good assumption is so useful in the 
classroom  and in policy debates that the burden of proof should rest on 
those who support a richer model.  Even in the face of strong evidence 
against the public-good model, he would apparently be reluctant to con- 
sider an extension.  I believe  that an unnecessary  reliance on this neo- 
classical  model has hampered clear thinking about growth, particularly 
among macroeconomists  and the students and policymakers  who listen 
to them. Even in the absence  of strong evidence  against this model, we 
must explore an extended  model that forces  us to think more carefully 
about the economics  of technology  and knowledge. 
The differences between  our modeling strategies may themselves  be 
the result of different beliefs  about the ultimate objectives  that econo- 
mists should pursue.  I believe  that our fundamental goals are, first, to 
uncover important truths, and then, to communicate them to outsiders. 
The order in this two-step process is important. We should start by using 
observation  and logic to decide what those truths are, without thinking 
ahead to the reception that awaits our findings. Once our results are in 
hand, we should communicate  them to the relevant outsiders,  without 
catering or condescending  to them. 
From this point of view, it follows almost immediately that we should 
work with an extended  theoretical framework that lets us take technol- 
ogy seriously.  It costs  little to adopt an extended  model because  these 
kinds of models have a mathematical structure that is only slightly more 
complicated  than that of the public-good  model.  On the benefit  side, 
technological  change  is an extremely  important force  in modern eco- 
nomic life, one that we would surely like to understand better. The ex- 
tended model forces  us to be precise  in our reasoning about intangible 
inputs like technology,  and it encourages us to adopt a broader perspec- 
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lic-good model of technology  can be nested as a special case of this ex- 
tended model,  working with the extension  keeps  all of our intellectual 
options open. 
There is, however,  another set of beliefs about what it is that econo- 
mists should do. According  to this view,  we should  think ahead to the 
reaction of our audience when we engage in research.  I am frequently 
warned that the models I use,  and the results I describe,  could be used 
to justify  bad government  policies.  The implication is that economists 
should filter their results, keeping in mind how they might be used in the 
political process.  From this point of view, a model that takes technology 
seriously poses risks that are not present in the public-good model. The 
public-good model used by Mankiw implies that the optimal government 
policy (at least for a small developing country) is laissez faire. As a result 
it is unlikely to provide support for the wrong kinds of policies. 
A similar strategic calculation could presumably apply to the reaction 
that  a  more  sophisticated  treatment  of  technology  would  provoke 
among students.  Precisely because  it does not try to capture any of the 
subtle issues that arise when we treat technology  and knowledge as eco- 
nomic goods,  the public-good model is familiar and unthreatening to the 
median student. If we plan with this student's reaction in mind, the intel- 
lectual power of a broader perspective  is a disadvantage rather than an 
advantage. It raises new issues,  some of which are not yet resolved.  Any 
discussion  of these issues  will inevitably leave many loose  ends.  If our 
strategy in doing research is to cater to the demands of a textbook  mar- 
ket that values simplicity, familiarity, and decisive answers over all else, 
a model  that treats technology  seriously  may indeed be something  to 
avoid. 
It is within this context  that the balance  of my comments  must be 
placed. I will point to empirical failures of the public-good model of tech- 
nology.  Many of the points I raise are not new. Jan Fagerberg provides 
a useful discussion of the history of objections to this approach to model- 
ing growth. I As the persistence  of this debate suggests,  a discussion  of 
the evidence  by itself is unlikely to resolve the differences of opinion on 
what is a good model of growth. Whether the problems noted below are 
minor issues  that a theory of growth can skip over or whether they are 
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decisive evidence against the public-good model may depend entirely on 
one's  views  about what the goal of growth theory,  or economics  more 
generally, should be. 
The recent history of the public-good model of cross-country  differ- 
ences  in wages  and income  is a story of strategic retreat. This kind of 
model gets the signs right for many questions about growth, but careful 
examination eventually  shows that it fails to explain the magnitudes ob- 
served in the data. As Mankiw explains in this paper, and as I have ar- 
gued elsewhere,  the first stage in this retreat came with the recognition 
that a model of the form Yj =  AKjaLjl -a  cannot explain the cross-coun- 
try data for values of the parameter ot  that are close to capital's share in 
total income.2 
This finding provoked two different responses.  The first was to allow 
for the possibility  that the technology  parameter, A, could vary across 
countries.  Early versions  of the endogenous  growth models  let A vary 
because  of spillover effects  from investment  in physical  capital or hu- 
man  capital.  More  recent  models  have  proposed  more  complicated 
mechanisms for producing variation in A, such as research and develop- 
ment, or trade in intermediate inputs in production.  But whatever  the 
cause  of the differences  in technology,  these  models  attribute an im- 
portant part of the cross-country  variation in wages and incomes to vari- 
ation in the technology  used in different countries. 
The other response was to leave A the same in all countries and to add 
an additional input, Hj (for human capital), that covaries  with Kj. The 
message  of Mankiw's paper with David Romer and David Weil is that 
this, by itself,  is enough.3 There is no need to consider  the possibility 
that the technology  might also vary across  countries.  As they show,  a 
model of the form Yj  = AKj 3j1j3L1"3 can be made to fit the cross-coun- 
try data. But as Mankiw recognizes  in subsequent work and reiterates in 
this paper, there are important quantitative problems with this model as 
well, when one looks beyond the national income accounts data used in 
the cross-country  regressions.4 If H and K covary across countries,  the 
rate of return to physical capital will be much higher in poor countries 
than in rich countries. 
The next retreat from the neoclassical  strategy of treating each nation 
2.  See Romer (1994). 
3.  Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). 
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as a closed economy  with the same public-good technology  is therefore 
to allow  the rate of return on physical  capital to be equalized  across 
countries through a process of international borrowing and lending. The 
relative scarcity of H can then be used to explain why total income and 
wages for unskilled workers are both lower in poor countries. 
As Mankiw observes,  this amended version of the Mankiw, Romer, 
and Weil model gets the signs right. The rate of return to investments 
in human capital does  seem to be higher in poor countries, just as this 
approach predicts.  What he fails to note is that the implied magnitudes 
are wildly inconsistent  with the available evidence.  Using the baseline 
model  with  exponents  of  one-third  on  the  three  main  inputs,  and 
allowing for free mobility of physical capital, an easy calculation leads 
to the following simple result. In the poorest countries,  where the wage 
for unskilled labor is one-tenth the wage for unskilled labor in the United 
States,  the wage for skilled labor will be ten times larger than the wage 
for skilled labor in the United States. Thus if the ratio of the skilled wage 
to the unskilled wage in the United States is two, the ratio of the skilled 
wage to the unskilled wage in the poor country will be two hundred! Be- 
cause the cost of education is the forgone unskilled wage, and the return 
to  education  is the  differential between  the  skilled  and the unskilled 
wage, the implied rate of return to education in poor countries should be 
larger than the return in the United States by a factor of one hundred, 
rather than by the factor of two or three that is found in the data.' More- 
over, as Robert Lucas has emphasized,  we can also use evidence  about 
migration to test our models of growth.6 Here the public-good model that 
Mankiw proposes  does  not  even  get  the  signs  right. The  net flow  of 
skilled workers is from poor countries to rich countries, rather than from 
rich to poor. 
The new fallback position for the neoclassical  model that Mankiw in- 
troduces in this paper is to suggest that the elasticity  of substitution be- 
tween capital and labor could be four or ten, instead of the value of one 
implied by a Cobb-Douglas  specification.  He raises this possibility  only 
in the context  of a model with two factors of production and leaves  the 
exploration of the model with three factors of production for future re- 
search. I will interpret his suggestion by treating one of the two inputs in 
5.  See  Psacharopoulos  (1985) for a description  of the  empirical results  on rates of 
return. 
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a CES production function as unskilled labor and letting the other input 
be a composite  of physical  capital and human capital. In this setting a 
higher elasticity  of substitution helps the model fit the data along some 
dimensions, but it hurts in others. As Mankiw emphasizes,  a higher elas- 
ticity of substitution can lead to large differences  in income per capita 
without inducing large differences  in rates of return to physical and hu- 
man capital. This reduces the amount by which the wage for the scarce 
skilled workers  in poor countries  exceeds  the wage for the abundant 
skilled workers in rich countries.  But this change also leads to reduc- 
tions in the predicted difference between  the wages for unskilled work- 
ers in rich and poor countries. 
To get an order of magnitude estimate of the effect that this change in 
the elasticity  of substitution can have on wages for the unskilled work- 
ers, let us accept the rough estimate that the share of total income accru- 
ing to physical  capital and human capital in the United  States is about 
0.8. Then we can calibrate a CES production function with an elasticity 
of substitution of four between  unskilled labor and the composite  of hu- 
man and physical capital. This implies that the wage for unskilled work- 
ers in a country that has zero human and zero physical capital is about 
60 percent of the wage for unskilled workers in the United States.  This 
fraction is far too high to be consistent  with the evidence  on cross-coun- 
try variation in wages for low-skilled workers. 
This kind of result should come as no surprise. Mankiw justifies  his 
high elasticity of substitution by invoking the arguments that lead to fac- 
tor price equalization.  In the limit, where the elasticity of substitution is 
infinite, wages for unskilled workers will be the same all over the world, 
regardless of the local stock of human and physical capital. The point for 
the purpose of this discussion is that an elasticity of four goes a long way 
toward infinity. 
The basic conclusion  that emerges from this account  is simple. The 
neoclassical  assumption  that the aggregate level  of technology  is the 
same in all countries is inconsistent  even with the macroeconomic  data 
on growth and development.  Fitting the public-good model of technol- 
ogy to the these data is like squeezing a balloon. You can make it smaller 
in one place, but problems always pop out somewhere  else. 
The  case  against  the  public-good  model  becomes  much  stronger 
when one looks at the microeconomic  evidence.  Formal comparisons of 
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same manufacturing industry. Even in a service industry such as retail- 
ing, firms such as K-Mart and Wal-Mart use very different technologies 
to provide their service,  with very different outcomes  in terms of profit- 
ability and returns on equity. These persistent differences are difficult to 
explain if the technology  that each uses is a public good. 
Furthermore, even  a cursory look at the details of the development 
experience  suggest  that the process  of technology  transfer by foreign 
firms has been important in many countries.  This process  of transfer is 
also responsive  to the incentives  created by the host government.  For 
example, when Mauritius pursued the traditional policy of erecting high 
tariff barriers to encourage import-substituting local manufacturing, its 
only exports  were  in agriculture. Once it had created an export proc- 
essing zone that let foreign firms earn profits by making use of local la- 
bor, garment assembly firms from Hong Kong located production there, 
and exports of garments from Mauritius to the United States and Europe 
grew dramatically. The garment assembly industry did not exist prior to 
the creation of the export processing  zone in 1970. By 1990 almost one- 
third of all employment on the island was in this industry. 
The impediment to the development  of a garment assembly  industry 
on Mauritius before  1970 was not a level of savings that was too low to 
finance the purchase of sewing machines. Nor was it a level of education 
too low for workers to be able to operate such machines.  The problem 
was that the relevant technology  was not a freely available public good. 
Until  the  foreign  entrepreneurs  arrived,  no  one  in  Mauritius  knew 
enough  about  the  garment business  to  begin  production  there.  This 
knowledge did not leak in from Hong Kong. It was brought in when en- 
trepreneurs were presented with an economic  environment that let them 
earn a profit on the knowledge  that they possessed.7  If the public-good 
model  does  not  apply  to  an industry  as  basic  as  garment assembly, 
where could it apply? 
We  have  overwhelming  evidence  that  technology  is  not  a  public 
good. We also have formal models of growth that let us take account of 
this fact. The puzzle for me is why many economists  still resist doing so 
in their teaching and in their research. The only conjecture that I can of- 
fer is the one outlined above. These economists  may be paying too much 
attention to how a particular model will be received  and used by out- 
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siders, and too little attention to what they think is true. Mankiw may be 
right that the neoclassical  model  "will continue  to be the first growth 
model taught to students and the first growth model used by policy ana- 
lysts." Nevertheless,  as economists,  we should not settle for this. Our 
goal should be to make them have second thoughts about a question that 
is  as  interesting  and as  important as  the  one  addressed  here:  What 
causes growth and development? 
General  Discussion 
There was a lively discussion  of the relative importance to growth of 
conventional  inputs, like physical capital, human capital, and labor, and 
intangible factors such as knowledge.  Several participants criticized the 
paper's assumption that knowledge is identical across countries.  James 
Duesenberry  argued that the process  by which modern techniques  are 
mastered is more complicated than simply sending people to school and 
handing them blueprints when they graduate. It typically involves  many 
kinds of learning, including experience  and interaction with foreigners. 
Robert Gordon emphasized  the importance  of organizational  capital, 
citing Paul Romer' s example of Mauritius. If organizational capital were 
not important,  the  management  consultant  industry  would  not exist. 
And Nordhaus  noted that technologies  differ in their rates of diffusion 
across space and time; he felt that we do not know very much about the 
process.  Barry Bosworth and John Haltiwanger noted that the variabil- 
ity of total factor productivity (TFP) supports these observations.  Even 
after human capital is accounted  for, there is tremendous  variation in 
TFP across  countries.  In fact within narrowly defined industries in the 
United  States  itself  there  are  large  productivity  differences  across 
plants. Moreover, these differentials are persistent; the most productive 
plants in 1995 were generally the most productive in 1985, and often also 
in  1975. William Brainard added  that productivity  differentials  exist 
even  within plants; different assembly  lines are often of different vin- 
tages, for example. 
Several participants thought that the paper gave short shrift to institu- 
tions and government policy.  Duesenberry  and William Branson found 
it curious that the study of "growth" emphasized theoretical models, na- 
tional production functions,  and cross-country  regressions  but failed to 
embrace the study of "development,"  which emphasizes  the develop- 
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which the government can affect efficiency; for example, overvalued ex- 
change rates,  parallel markets,  subsidies,  rationing, state enterprises, 
corruption, volatile inflation, interest rate regulation, and capital alloca- 
tion.  Several  members of the panel presented  evidence  on the impor- 
tance of government  policy.  Nordhaus  suggested  that the narrow con- 
centration on factor inputs as the source of growth was rejected by what 
he called  the socialist  experiment.  Although  Eastern  European coun- 
tries were relatively well endowed with physical and human capital after 
World War II, this just seemed  to help them go downhill. According to 
research by Fred Bergsten,  in the U.S.S.R.,  Hungary. Poland, and Yu- 
goslavia  output per worker in  1975 was  30 percent  lower  than in the 
Western countries,  after accounting for differences  in capital and land 
per worker and adjusting for labor quality. Bosworth  noted that, while 
socialist economies  clearly underperformed capitalist economies,  it has 
been more difficult to demonstrate the benefits of liberalizing measures 
in economies  that have pursued a middle road. For instance, he interpre- 
ted the evidence  as indicating that trade promotion  has been  a better 
strategy than trade liberalization. 
Jeffrey  Frankel thought  that government  policy  toward  trade and 
openness  was worthy of special comment.  Although human and physi- 
cal capital explain much of the variation in GDP, trade explains  a sig- 
nificant portion of the residual. The positive correlation between growth 
and openness  is a robust finding of cross-country  studies,  and is con- 
firmed in the paper by Sachs and Warner in this volume.  Frankel also 
argued that causation has convincingly  been shown to run from trade to 
growth,  as there now  exist  relatively  good  instrumental variables for 
trade. One of the channels through which trade aids growth is by facili- 
tating the transfer of technology. 
Haltiwanger  noted  that  an  important  component  of  productivity 
growth is the reallocation  of resources  to the more productive  plants, 
implying that policies  interfering with resource  mobility can have  sig- 
nificant effects.  Bosworth pointed out that some countries have had neg- 
ative TFP growth for periods lasting many years, a fact that the neoclas- 
sical model cannot account  for. In addition to government  policy  and 
technological  diffusion,  Bosworth  emphasized  the importance of mac- 
roeconomic  stability, reminding the Panel of Arthur Okun's dictum that 
"one recession  can wipe out a thousand Harberger triangles." He noted 
that a number of countries  show negative TFP growth over certain pe- 
riods. These  data points,  which represent  the loss  of precious  ground 322  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
gained, can be attributed largely to economic  crises.  One secret of suc- 
cess  of the Asian economies  has been their ability to avoid periods of 
declining output. 
While agreeing that institutions and technological  diffusion cannot be 
ignored as sources of growth, and that the neoclassical  model sheds no 
light on the effects  of science  policy,  trade policy,  the socialist  experi- 
ment, and the like, Mankiw asserted that doing so was not its purpose. 
He defended the model as being good at what it is supposed to do -ex- 
plain differences  in standards of living across countries and time. A re- 
gression with per capita income levels on the left and saving rates, popu- 
lation growth rates, and human capital variables on the right has an R2 
around 0.78. He noted that the neoclassical  model seems to work well in 
explaining the experience  of the newly industrializing countries (NICs) 
in Asia.  Alwyn  Young's  research indicates  that the NICs grew mainly 
through the accumulation of physical and human capital, rather than in- 
creases  in TFP. 
Gordon  echoed  Romer's  comments  about  wage  differentials.  He 
wondered how it is that an individual migrating to the United States with 
the same human capital as in his home country can work with about the 
same physical  capital as in his home country and raise his standard of 
living by a factor of ten. He reasoned that to explain this, one needs to 
allow for complementarity  among factors  of production.  Mankiw sug- 
gested that the model's difficulty in explaining facts like these reflects an 
oversimplified  production function.  He believed  that human capital is 
fundamentally  different from physical  capital,  implying the need for a 
production function that explicitly included both. 
Benjamin Friedman noted that the correlation between  saving rates 
and income  per capita is poor.  Many high-income  countries  have low 
saving rates,  and vice  versa;  a notable  comparison  is the low-saving 
United  States  with the high-saving China. But he was less  pessimistic 
than Mankiw about the accuracy  of the neoclassical  growth model in 
predicting rates of convergence.  The estimated rate is about 0.02, while 
the predicted rate is 0.04; given the usual downward bias in regression 
coefficient  estimates,  and the  inherent  difficulty  of  fitting models  to 
facts,  Friedman thought the model actually gets pretty close. 
There was debate about whether human capital helps to explain much 
of the variation in economic  growth. Frankel and Bosworth both noted 
that adding human capital to growth regressions  significantly improves 
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1960s that estimated that close  to 60 percent of the difference between 
developed and less developed countries is attributable to human capital. 
However,  Nordhaus  said that, using Denison's  technique  to measure 
the impact of education on productivity growth and income growth, one 
finds that it explains  very little of the differences  across  countries.  He 
preferred Denison's  approach for its  "internal consistency."  Richard 
Cooper  suggested  that comparison  of national capital-to-output  ratios 
provides evidence on this point. The rank correlation between per capita 
income and capital stock per unit of output is nearly perfect.  The only 
outlier whose capital-to-output ratio is lower than expected  is the United 
States,  suggesting  more efficient  use  of capital.  He  dismissed  human 
capital as a full explanation because,  in that case, American human capi- 
tal per worker would need to be way out of line with that of other rich 
OECD  countries,  including  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  France, 
and Japan. 
Gordon expressed  skepticism about the importance of investment ex- 
ternalities in some models of endogenous growth. In particular, he ques- 
tioned the plausibility of the De Long and Summers thesis  that equip- 
ment investment plays a special role. In the United States from 1936 to 
the present,  the ratio of equipment to structures has increased  steadily 
from 1/1 to 3/1. There has been little correlation between  this ratio and 
growth,  as the increasing importance of equipment has continued  un- 
abated during both fast and slow periods. Nordhaus stated that although 
the evidence  is clear on externalities  to R&D, he knew of no evidence 
for the existence  of returns to physical capital that are not captured by 
the firm. 
Some discussants  offered suggestions  for future empirical research. 
Duesenberry thought that researchers working with cross-country  data 
should pay more attention  to important events  at the microeconomic 
level.  By  using  microeconomic  data,  he  thought  it possible  to  avoid 
some of the identification problems that plague macroeconomic  studies. 
Nordhaus cautioned that researchers defining human capital as an input 
need to account for it on the output side also; they need to take care to 
count production of human capital not as consumption,  but as invest- 
ment. He thought most empirical studies get the accounting  of human 
capital wrong, with Dale Jorgenson's  recent work a noteworthy  excep- 
tion. Friedman suggested that it was important to be explicit in empirical 
research about whether economies  are to be treated as if they are at their 
steady states. 324  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1995 
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